عنوان
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Ownership and Control theory as factors affecting underpricing of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs
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نوع پژوهش
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مقاله چاپشده در مجلات علمی
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کلیدواژهها
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Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), Underpricing, Ownership and Control Theory, Retain Control, Reduce Agency Costs
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چکیده
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The paper represents the ownership and control theory as factors affecting underpricing of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). The main reason to remain private is to preserve decision making control ownership. It is argued that botoh public and private ownership entail information advantages and that the optimal decision on this structure minimizes the related costs. The degree of underpricing is positively related to ownership retained, for a given cash flow variance. Underpricing is a means to entrench managerial contorl and the attendant agency costs by avoiding monitoring by a large outside shareholders. It will increase the investor base and ownership dispersion with the objective of increasing liquidity or reducing monitoring by large shareholders. It also ensures a good dispersion of shares and a lower level of control. Underpricing represents a significant fration of the total cost of going public. It provides managers with protection of private control the corporate control market. Agency Costs are ultimately borne by the owners of a company, in the form of lower IPO proceeds and a lower subsequent market value for their shares. Underpricing is used to minimize agency costs by encouraging monitoring. Underpricing increases the investor base and ownerships dispersed with the objective of increasing litigation or reducing monitoring by large shareholders.
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پژوهشگران
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پرستو صداقت (نفر اول)، پرفسور شاراد ال. جوشی (نفر دوم)
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