Introduction The feeling of having free will is closely related to other sub- ective experiences such as consciousness, mental causation, and elf-perception. Free will or volition is an age-old concept and as been discussed among philosophers for a long time, and even mong psychologists until the emergence of behaviorism. By the mergence of cognitive revolution, psychologists and neuroscien- ists accepted volition as a central topic in their studies. Methods There are two important empirical paradigms developed by Benjamin Libet and Daniel Wegner on conscious will that closely elate to the two well known philosophical schools of thought, ibertarianism and compatibilism, respectively. As will be ex- lained in detail in the following sections, while Libet believed in he causal role of free will, Wegner argues that free will is an illu- ion but has an important role in human life. Here, these empirical findings and related theories are discussed, and then the main is- ues about both views are noted. Finally, a new approach by Wal- ace, based on Buddhism, is reviewed, to examine its implications or the mentioned debates. Results As will be explained in details, while Libet believes in the causal promising to some degree, they do not cover the whole process involved in volition. Libet’s theory is mainly about the primary origination and the canceling of a simple action. Wegner’s theory is also mainly about authorship and priming of simple actions. Therefore, they seem to be based on the actions that are not depen- dent on decision-making and active control of choice behaviour. A main dilemma in all such studies is the homunculus problem. This problem has long been around in cognitive psychology and cognitive science. Conclusion Free will, despite many controversies, remains as a major topic in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Dennett believed that homunculus could be decomposed into neural process. On the other hand, Wallace argued that his view goes beyond
